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and Douglas D. Evanoff, senior financial economist and vice president
When corporate governance is effective, it helps safeguard shareholders, customers,
and employees without hindering appropriate risk-taking. But when it is ineffective, it
can have a disastrous impact on these key stakeholders and on the long-term viability
of the enterprise. This year’s Conference on Bank Structure and Competition brought
some of the nation’s top policymakers and bankers together to discuss corporate
governance reform and the role of financial firms and regulators.
Recent examples of
corporate malfeasance
have led to greater investor
skepticism and increased
uncertainty in the equity
and credit markets.
On May 7–9, 2003, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago hosted its 39th annual
Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition. This year’s conference fo-
cused on the effectiveness and appro-
priate role of boards of directors,
shareholders, creditors (including
banks), financial regulators, accounting
standards, and disclosure rules in gov-
erning the behavior of corporate man-
agers. Recently, a number of highly
publicized events have highlighted the
importance of having an effective corpo-
rate governance structure. Once-revered
companies such as Arthur Andersen,
Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom have been
severely damaged, in some cases beyond
repair, by failure to follow appropriate
corporate governance principles. Thou-
sands of jobs and billions of dollars of
value have been lost. Financial services
firms have been affected through their
credit exposures to firms that followed
questionable accounting practices, as
well as through their own corporate
governance practices.
In his opening remarks, Chicago Fed
President Michael H. Moskow empha-
sized that the recent examples of cor-
porate malfeasance have “led to
greater investor skepticism and in-
creased uncertainty in the equity and
credit markets.” This “uncertainty
affects asset prices and can negatively
impact the economy,” he added.
The corporate governance system can
be defined as the interactions among
shareholders, managers, boards of di-
rectors, and outside auditors and ana-
lysts, together with the laws, regulations,
and institutions that govern their ac-
tions. When this system is effective, it
helps safeguard shareholders, custom-
ers, and employees without hindering
appropriate risk-taking. But when it is
ineffective, it can have a disastrous im-
pact on these key stakeholders and on
the long-term viability of the enterprise.
Key questions that were addressed
during the conference include:
• How should we reform our corpo-
rate governance structure?
￿ What should financial firms be do-
ing to address these reforms?
￿ How should financial regulators re-
spond? Is there the potential for
overreaction?
￿ What best governance practices ex-
ist in the industry? Are they trans-
ferable? Does the structure of bank
boards significantly affect the ex-
tent of corporate governance?We could not have achieved our current level of
national productivity if corporate governance had been
deeply flawed.
A special theme panel on these issues,
featured Susan Schmidt Bies, governor,
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; Elizabeth A. Duke,
vice chairman, American Bankers
Association, and senior vice president,
South Trust Corporation; Randall S.
Kroszner, member, President’s Council
of Economic Advisors and University
of Chicago; Katherine Schipper, mem-
ber, Financial Accounting Standards
Board; and Kenneth Scott, Ralph M.
Parsons Professor of Law and Business
Emeritus, Stanford Law School. Other
sessions addressed the financial servic-
es regulatory and legislative agenda,
future directions for the financial mar-
kets, banking relationships and corpo-
rate behavior, and the potential for
extracting information from market
and accounting data.
In his keynote address to the confer-
ence, Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Alan Greenspan was optimistic about
both the future of financial services and
the state of corporate governance, not-
withstanding recent events. Our system
of corporate governance “has evolved
over the past century to more effectively
promote the allocation of the nation’s
savings to its most productive uses. And,
generally speaking, the resulting struc-
ture of business incentives, reporting,
and accountability has served us well.
We could not have achieved our current
level of national productivity if corporate
governance had been deeply flawed,”
said Greenspan. Moskow, in a session
on the private and public sector respons-
es to corporate governance problems,
agreed that the U.S. system of corporate
governance is not deeply flawed. “I do
not believe that our system of corporate
governance needs a massive overhaul,
and any changes that we make must be
consistent with a fundamental reliance
on the market as the arbiter of a firm’s
performance.” He indicated that the
success of this system relies on two
fundamental economic principles:
1) The incentives of managers should
be aligned with the goals of the share-
holders; and 2) the firm’s financial
condition should be sufficiently trans-
parent to enable shareholders to eval-
uate the performance of managers
based on public information.
According to Moskow, the corporate
governance system should include
checks and balances to make sure that
funds are wisely and efficiently invested
by corporate managers. Kroszner con-
curred, adding that the system of checks
and balances should be readily observ-
able by outsiders.
Markets versus rules and regulations
Cynthia A. Glassman, commissioner, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission,
who also spoke in the session on the
private and public sector responses,
cautioned against the unintended con-
sequences of rules and regulations and
argued in favor of market-based solu-
tions. “The nature of regulations is
that they have general applicability,”
said Glassman, “and it is difficult to
consider and craft a response that is ap-
propriate to all situations.” Moskow also
discussed the consequence of relying on
regulation rather than the marketplace
to discipline and monitor managers’
behavior. “To be sure, the market will
occasionally make mistakes—but the
danger in replacing the market with
regulations is that regulations typically
more complex question is whether this
greater volume of information has led
to comparable improvements in the
transparency of firms.” He argued that
public disclosure and transparency are
not interchangeable, and that “trans-
parency challenges market participants
not only to provide information, but
also to place that information in a con-
text that makes it meaningful. Trans-
parency challenges market participants
to present information in ways that ac-
curately reflect risks. Much disclosure
currently falls short of these more de-
manding goals.”
Bies suggested that investors and cred-
itors should be provided with the in-
formation necessary to understand the
risks that a firm is bearing and those that
it has transferred to others. Thomas
M. Hoenig, president, Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, who spoke in a ses-
sion on the financial services regulato-
ry and legislative agenda, came to the
same conclusion, saying that “a critical
goal for us [regulators] to explore is how
to enhance market discipline by provid-
ing market participants with adequate,
timely, and accurate information for
make even more mistakes than the mar-
ket. Just recall the unintended effects
that the Glass-Steagall Act had on our
financial system and the 60 years it
took for us to repeal the harmful por-
tions of that Act,” noted Moskow.
Glassman said that one of the most im-
portant jobs a manager of a public com-
pany has is accurate disclosure. “To
make sure that the disclosures fairly
present the company’s financial condi-
tion ... managers should spend their
time on the critical accounting judg-
ments and corporate events that are
most important to ensuring clear and
accurate disclosure.” Greenspan noted,
however, that “although we have made
great strides in expanding the volume
of publicly disclosed information ... a
making decisions.” He indicated that
the bank supervisory agencies could
help in this area. Bank supervisory
agencies make use of proprietary and
internal information at each bank, as
well as confidential information on
customers that, in general, is not avail-
able to market participants. While ac-
knowledging that the Securities and
Exchange Commission already requires
publicly traded banks to disclose any
significant news in a timely manner,
Hoenig argued that the release of sig-
nificant or material examination find-
ings could enhance market discipline.
“Disclosure of significant examination
findings could ... help make a bank’s
own disclosures more accurate and
more reflective of supervisory con-
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of having to make such disclosures would
provide banks with an added incentive
to monitor and manage their risk ex-
posures carefully and to comply with
regulatory objectives,” said Hoenig.
While Hoenig examined steps that bank
supervisors could take to improve the
market access to information, Gary H.
Stern, president, Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis, in the same session,
discussed how market information could
be used in the supervisory framework.
Stern said that market prices of equity,
debt, derivatives, and other financial
instruments contain valuable informa-
tion on the riskiness of individual banks,
and the risk measures derived from
these prices provide useful informa-
tion that adds to the existing knowl-
edge of bank examiners.
Effective risk-management and
transparency practices
Bies discussed how developments in
risk-management practices could
strengthen corporate governance and
market transparency. Risk-management
processes are designed to identify risks
and report on the effectiveness of in-
ternal controls to senior management
and boards of directors. During the last
two decades, dramatic changes have
occurred in financial innovation, finan-
cial engineering, and risk-management
practices. Financial services firms have
altered their operations, shifting away
from the management of traditional
products, such as deposits and loans, to
management of nontraditional prod-
ucts, such as credit derivatives. These
nontraditional products have facilitated
the separation and reallocation of risks
to parties more willing and able to bear
them. An important part of this evolu-
tion has been the development of meth-
odologies for measuring and monitoring
risk. “As companies have become in-
creasingly diverse, and risk-management
tools more sophisticated,” said Bies,
“the time has come for companies, in-
cluding financial firms, to look at risk
in a more formal way across the orga-
nization and in all its dimensions.”
Greenspan discussed the importance
of incentives for effective risk manage-
ment. He challenged the view that
government regulation is essential to
ensuring efficacious risk management
and stated that “private regulation gen-
erally is far better at constraining ex-
cessive risk-taking than is government
regulation.” He noted that “market par-
ticipants usually have strong incentives
to monitor and control the risks they as-
sume in choosing to deal with particular
counterparties. In essence, prudential
regulation is supplied by the market
through counterparty evaluation and
monitoring rather than by authorities.”
CEO compensation and independent
directors
An aspect of the discussion on corporate
governance problems is how chief exec-
utive officers (CEOs) are compensated.
The use of equity-based compensation
(stock options and restricted stock) has
come under increasing public and
congressional scrutiny. While equity-
based compensation contracts are in-
tended to encourage executives to take
actions that are consistent with the ex-
pectations of shareholders, they have
not always accomplished this goal. This
has led to demands for greater transpar-
ency in executive stock option programs
and, in some cases, to elimination of
the programs.
In his luncheon speech, Jamie Dimon,
chairman and chief executive officer
of Bank One, argued that compensa-
tion has become excessive, indicating
that compensation levels are unrelated
to how well firms are performing.
“This, I put in the category of lack of
leadership. It hurts companies; it
hurts America; and [that’s] why it will
have legs in Washington,” said Dimon.
The tax code, which states that executive
compensation above $1 million must
be “performance-based” in order to be
tax deductible, encourages firms to pay
their top executives with stock options
rather than with cash. Moskow suggest-
ed several changes in the way firms com-
pensate their top executives. “We can
begin by eliminating accounting rules
and tax laws that interfere with the man-
ner in which boards of directors choose
to compensate executive officers. Boards
should design their executive compen-
sation plans to reward managers for
exemplary firm performance, not to
exploit tax and accounting rules that
favor one type of compensation over
another,” said Moskow.
If stock options are to remain an impor-
tant part of many executives’ compen-
sation, Moskow argued that the contracts
should be redesigned to allow for vari-
able strike prices. The current practice
of using fixed strike prices has led to
enormous increases in executive wealth
when the overall stock market rises as
it did during the 1990s. “Because these
options were not indexed to the mar-
ket, this led to enormous—and let me
say quite unexpected—increases in the
wealth of some executives. And many
of them reaped these windfalls even
though the price of their firms’ stock
had underperformed those of their
peers,” said Moskow.
Linking the strike prices to the perfor-
mance of the company’s stock relative
to a market or industry index, Moskow
said, “would insure that overall run-
ups in the stock market do not benefit
managers whose companies are under-
performing. It also would ensure that
overall declines in the stock market do
not penalize managers whose firms are
doing well relative to their peers. Index-
ing also will reduce the incentive to re-
set option strike prices at firms whose
stock price has declined.”
In her discussion on the oversight of
executive compensation, Glassmansuggested that the corporate board
could carry out its oversight role by pro-
viding appropriate incentives to man-
agement, and “compensation is the
biggest carrot the board has in terms of
incentives.” As a principle of good gov-
ernance, Glassman further suggested
that “the compensation committee
should be comprised solely of indepen-
dent directors” and by independent, she
meant the “true independence that
goes beyond the technicalities of
Commission rules or listing standards.”
According to Duke, “one of the biggest
issues concerning large, publicly traded
banks is the definition of director inde-
pendence.” She stressed that the current
proposals discussing director indepen-
dence fail to recognize that banks are
different. Banks are different, because
they “need a definition of director inde-
pendence that recognizes that directors
should be able to do business with the
banks on whose boards they sit. Yet some
of the proposals would forbid bank direc-
tors from ‘purchasing’ their bank’s
products and services.” Duke cited the
example in which a director of Wal-Mart
is not prohibited from walking into the
store and buying something, and “sim-
ilarly, a bank director should not be pro-
hibited from doing business with the
bank under the same terms and condi-
tions offered to the public.”
During his luncheon speech, Kenneth
D. Lewis, chairman, president, and CEO
of Bank of America, stressed that it is
more interdependence than indepen-
dence that makes a board of directors
strong and effective. He said that while
“independence is a very useful tool for
insulating some functions from inap-
propriate influence or conflicts of in-
terest … excessive independence also has
disadvantages.” Lewis defined excessive
independence as “the lack of a mean-
ingful relationship between a director
and the company he or she is charged
with directing, or the lack of a strong
relationship between board members
and the CEO.” According to Lewis, “it
is dangerous to assume a direct corre-
lation between ever-greater degrees of
board independence and improved
corporate performance.” It is not the
degree of independence from the com-
pany or chairman that determines
whether an individual is a strong and
effective director, but rather “it is their
character, values, strategic insight, busi-
ness knowledge, and their ability to in-
fluence and work well with others. It is
their ability to create productive inter-
dependence with their fellow directors.”
Scott pointed out that the current cor-
porate governance problems extend well
beyond the structure of the board of
directors. “The general problem in
corporate governance is the principal
controlling the agent—the owners trying
to control the managers to act in the
interest of the principal or owners and
not be self-serving. The board is only one
device for achieving that kind of control
over management,” said Scott. He
concluded that one really has to look
at the structure of share ownership in
the firm and at the legal system.
Conclusion
This year’s Bank Structure Conference
highlighted the importance of having
an appropriate system of corporate gov-
ernance for both financial and nonfi-
nancial firms. Conference participants
were in general agreement that our sys-
tem of market discipline and corporate
governance has served us well, but the
recent examples of corporate miscon-
duct have revealed areas where repairs
are needed. Bank supervisory agencies
can play an important role by using in-
ternal data and market data in their
supervisory framework and encourag-
ing the banking industry to be leaders
in strengthening the system of corporate
governance. “Banking supervisors will
continue to encourage the banking in-
dustry to be leaders in strengthening
corporate governance, risk management,
and internal controls and in implement-
ing transparent accounting and disclo-
sure practices,” noted Bies.
The 40th annual conference will be
held May 5–7, 2004. The 2004 theme,
“How do banks compete? Strategy,
regulation, and technology,” will focus
on how commercial banks have reposi-
tioned themselves to compete under
new economic, technological, and reg-
ulatory conditions. For more informa-
tion on the upcoming conference, go
to www.chicagofed.org.